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The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser
has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence
of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air’s
varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve’s at-
tack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with
a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbu-
lence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver, or using beam
wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to
find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve’s attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant
parties to exchange secret keys with – in theory – uncon-
ditional security [1, 2]. However in practice, a QKD sys-
tem is often not perfect, and unconditional security can-
not be guaranteed. Any imperfections in the physical im-
plementation of a QKD scheme can lead to side-channels
that could be exploited by an eavesdropper (Eve) and
compromise security [3–17]. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance to perform security evaluations of practical
systems, i.e., scrutinize vulnerabilities, determine useful
testing methodologies and assess the risk to formulate
countermeasures for preventing successful attacks.
A widely studied implementation of QKD utilizes free-
space communication between two parties (Alice and
Bob) through the atmosphere [18–24], which allows for
long distance point-to-point links on the order of 100km.
This communication distance can be extended even fur-
ther to the global scale by introducing satellite-based
QKD systems [22–29]. However, free-space communica-
tion can be vulnerable to an eavesdropper attack, such
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as when Eve precisely controls the incidence angle of an
attack laser directed at Bob’s QKD receiver. Directing a
laser in this way can induce a change in the measurement
efficiencies of one (or more) detection channels, which en-
ables Eve to do an intercept-resend (IR) attack that may
compromise the system’s security [13, 30].
The success of this spatial mode attack depends on the
eavesdropper’s ability to precisely maintain specific beam
angles to a free-space QKD receiver, which attacks dif-
ferent detection channels. Atmospheric turbulence could
compromise or even prevent such an attack as turbulence
causes a beam to randomly wander along its trajectory,
as well as inducing various optical aberrations such as
astigmatism, defocus, coma, etc. Stronger turbulence
conditions result in a larger variance in the amount of
beam wander [31]. Consideration of these physical limi-
tations on Eve is not usually included in the theoretical
security analysis of a system, but can be useful to verify
whether an attack is feasible under more realistic condi-
tions.
In this paper, we experimentally determine the mini-
mum strength of atmospheric turbulence that could pre-
vent a successful attack on our free-space polarization-
based QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbu-
lence using a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM).
Since there are limitations on how well adaptive optics
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2can correct for turbulence, our paper explores to what
level Eve must correct her attack beam to still be suc-
cessful [32, 33]. We assume that the sender (Alice) and
the receiver (Bob) only monitor the total count rates (as
opposed to the rates of individual channels), and that
they use a non-decoy state BB84Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [1]. We also assume that Eve has ac-
cess to a weak coherent pulse source and state of the
art photo-detectors, and does not have a quantum re-
peater. Furthermore, we assume that Eve cannot replace
the quantum channel with a lossless channel. We find
that an attack on our free-space receiver could still suc-
ceed if Eve can correct the tip-tilt mode for turbulence
as strong as r0 = 1.53 cm (assuming an initial beam di-
ameter of 20 cm), where r0 is the atmospheric coherence
length. This result defines an “unsafe radius” of 543 m
around Bob’s receiver in typical sea level turbulence con-
ditions where Eve’s attack could be successful if done
within this radius.
First we discuss our SLM setup used to emulate atmo-
spheric turbulence, and how we verified its accuracy and
reproducibility in Sec. II. Then we describe the compo-
nents and operation of our free-space polarization-based
QKD receiver under test in Sec. III. In Secs. IV and V, we
discuss the results from spatial mode attacks performed
in various turbulence strengths, following a similar pro-
cedure to Sajeed et al. in Ref. 13. Finally, in Sec. VI
we discuss an entanglement breaking scheme proposed
by Zhang et al. in Ref. 34, to theoretically verify if
there exists an attack strategy for Eve, even if Alice and
Bob know about their detection efficiency mismatch, and
monitor the statistics of all possible detection outcomes.
We conclude in Sec. VII.
II. TURBULENCE EMULATOR
We use a phase-only SLM to emulate a turbulent QKD
channel in the laboratory. One advantage of using a SLM
as opposed to performing the experiment outdoors is the
ability to generate a range of turbulence strengths, from
weak upper atmosphere to stronger sea level conditions.
In addition, by performing our experiment in a labora-
tory, we are immune to the unpredictability of an outdoor
environment, allowing us to repeat the same attack an-
gles on our free-space QKD receiver under reproducible
turbulence conditions.
Our model uses the ‘thin phase screen approximation’
which emulates turbulence using a single random phase
screen in the aperture of the receiver, as opposed to re-
quiring two holograms to model multiple parameters that
incorporate both phase and amplitude variations [35].
We assume that Eve’s laser can mimic the intensity varia-
tions caused by turbulence (scintillation) [36]. Note that
the absence of these fluctuations could arouse Alice and
Bob’s suspicion of an eavesdropper in the channel, al-
though fluctuations on the time scale of scintillation at
1s or less are rarely monitored in practice.
In order to reproduce the random statistics of turbu-
lence, we load a series of 29 phase maps per turbulence
strength on the SLM to distort the optical wavefront.
The strength of the turbulence is completely character-
ized by the ratio of the initial beam diameter, D, to the
atmospheric coherence length, r0; turbulence dominates
over diffractive effects when D/r0  1.
We generate our phase holograms based on the well-
known Kolmogorov model [37] that uses a weighted su-
perposition of Zernike polynomials for the basis-set [38].
There are several advantages to using Zernike polyno-
mials to generate the holograms as their weights can be
analytically calculated based on the turbulence strength
[39]. Furthermore, Zernike polynomials directly relate
to known optical aberrations, such as tip-tilt, defocus,
astigmatism, coma, etc. Therefore, it is straightforward
to characterize the SLM’s ability to reliably and precisely
emulate atmospheric turbulence by comparing calculated
Zernike polynomial coefficients to those reconstructed by
a measurement device, such as a wavefront sensor.
The radial phase function φ(ρ, θ) that describes each
hologram is given by a weighted sum of several Zernike
polynomials as φ(ρ, θ) =
∑
i ciZi, where Zi and ci are the
Zernike polynomial and corresponding coefficient for the
ith polynomial, respectively, following the Noll labeling
convention and normalization constants [38]. We use 44
Zernike polynomials to ensure a complex spatial struc-
ture that can accurately emulate a range of atmospheric
turbulence strengths.
Based on the Kolmogorov model [37, 39], if we assume
that the Zernike coefficients are normally distributed
with mean zero, then ci are random drawings from dis-
tributions with variance σ2nm defined as
σ2nm = Inm(D/r0)
5/3, (1)
r0 = 1.68(C
2
nLk
2)−3/5,
Inm =
0.15337(−1)n−m(n+ 1)Γ(14/3)Γ(n− 5/6)
Γ(17/6)2Γ(n+ 23/6)
,
where C2n is the refractive-index structure constant of the
atmosphere, L is the path length through the turbulent
atmosphere that has a constant C2n, k = 2pi/λ, λ is the
laser wavelength, and Γ is the Gamma function. The in-
dices n and m are related to the Zernike polynomial order
following the Noll labeling convention, where n ≥ |m| and
n−m is even [38]. We note that the subscript “n” of C2n
is not related to the index “n” used in the Zernike poly-
nomials, but instead to the refractive index of the atmo-
sphere. A single value of C2n is used when calculating σ
2
nm
over each of the n and m indices for each atmospheric
strength modelled. A large C2n (small r0) value corre-
sponds to stronger atmospheric turbulence. An example
of stronger turbulent conditions that could be found at
sea level corresponds to r0 = 1.00 cm over L = 1 km for
D = 20 cm at λ = 532 nm, whereas weaker conditions at
high altitude corresponds to r0 = 7.00 cm [37].
Since Zernike polynomials directly relate to known op-
tical aberrations, we can use simple equations and mea-
3FIG. 1. Comparison between measured and theoretical far-field intensity distributions of a laser beam corresponding to one
of 29 SLM phase holograms per turbulence strength (r0) for a beam with D = 20 cm and λ = 532 nm. The greyscale in
the holograms represents a 0 to 2pi phase range. The results show our SLM setup accurately emulates a range of turbulence
strengths.
surement devices (CCD camera and wavefront sensor),
to independently verify and characterize our turbulence
emulator. Figure 1 shows both the simulated and mea-
sured far-field intensity distributions of a beam after
its wavefront has been distorted by the SLM hologram.
Each hologram shown is one example from a set of 29
holograms per r0 value used to emulate how different
strengths of turbulence would affect a 20 cm beam at
532 nm. We experimentally image the far-field by plac-
ing a camera in the focal plane of a lens that is located
one focal length from the SLM. This arrangement maps
the phase wavefront imprinted on the beam by the holo-
gram into an intensity distribution at the camera plane.
Note that we include an additional x-grating in the holo-
gram (not shown for clarity) to spatially separate the
first-order diffracted beam from the zeroth-order one, as
only the first-order beam contains the pure phase wave-
front. The zeroth-order (and higher-order) diffracted
beams were carefully blocked shortly after the SLM.
We also verify our turbulence emulator by examining
the centroid deviations caused by each hologram. This
is an important characterization as beam displacements
due to turbulence could dominate Eve’s ability to repeat-
edly send a beam at precise angles to the receiver. Beam
wander is the strongest effect on average as the tip-tilt co-
efficients (n = 1, m = ±1) have the largest weights over-
all [I11 = 0.45 from eq. (1)], whereas defocus (I20 = 0.02)
and astigmatism (I22 = 0.02) have a smaller contribu-
tion on average. Higher order aberrations can also cause
centroid displacement, especially in the case of stronger
turbulence.
There is a direct relationship between the tilt angle
variance of centroid displacement for two uncorrelated
axes σ2 and the turbulence strength r0, which is given
by [31]
σ2 = 0.364
(
D
r0
)5/3(
λ
r0
)5/3
. (2)
Since this equation is independent of the method used to
emulate turbulence, we can verify whether the 29 cho-
sen phase holograms accurately portray the statistics of
atmospheric turbulence both theoretically via computer
simulations of far-field intensity distributions, and ex-
perimentally through our SLM setup. This independent
verification ensures that the holograms are accurate, as
well as that the SLM is correctly imprinting the phase
mask onto the beam.
The centroid displacement data presented in fig. 2
corresponds to low-altitude sea level turbulence (r0 =
1.00 cm for a 20 cm beam). The simulated centroid dis-
placements from 500 holograms are shown in fig. 2(a).
Each data point corresponds to a unique hologram
[fig. 2(c)] and far-field intensity distribution [fig. 2(d)].
The simulated centroids follow a Gaussian distribution
with a standard deviation σ that is in agreement with
eq. (2). These results confirm that the phase holo-
grams we calculated properly emulate the statistics of
low-altitude sea level turbulence, irrespective of the SLM
setup. Similar tests were performed to verify the sets of
holograms for each r0 value tested in this experiment.
We compare simulated and measured centroid dis-
placements of 29 holograms per r0 strength in fig. 2(b).
The number of holograms used in the hacking experi-
ment was limited to reduce data acquisition time and
stability issues while scanning. Therefore, we chose 29
holograms from a larger distribution of 500 to emulate
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FIG. 2. Turbulence emulator characterization for r0 =
1.00 cm, D = 20 cm, and λ = 532 nm. (a) Simulated cen-
troid displacements corresponding to 500 phase holograms (σ
is the two-axis standard deviation). The diameter of each
data point is proportional to the count frequency. The cen-
troid displacement distribution is normally distributed along
both axes in agreement with eq. (2). (b) Comparison between
measured and simulated centroid displacements for a subset
of 29 holograms. This subset was chosen to represent the nor-
mal statistical distribution of the 500-hologram set. The mea-
sured values are within error of most theoretical predictions
(error bars for measured data are represented by diameter of
data points). (c) Phase hologram and (d) far-field intensity
distribution corresponding to one centroid data point.
each r0 strength. The holograms were chosen based on
their centroid displacements being approximately 0.5σ,
σ, 2σ and 3σ from the origin [along the dashed circles
outlined in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)], along with one histogram
with no turbulence representing 0σ. The centroid results,
along with the qualitative comparison between theoreti-
cal and measured far-field intensity distributions (fig. 1),
confirmed we had excellent agreement between theory
and experiment for turbulence emulated by our SLM
setup. The 29th hologram always emulates 0σ displace-
ment with no turbulence. The contribution of each of the
29 holograms to the emulated turbulence in subsequent
experiments is weighted by its probability of occurrence,
which follows a Gaussian distribution. This probability
of occurrence is a definite integral of normalized Gaus-
sian distribution over the annulus formed by the adjacent
radii shown in fig. 2(b). We refer to each annulus by the
name of its inner radius, near which its holograms are
located. The 0σ annulus, extending from zero (where its
hologram is located) to 0.5σ radius, has the weight of
0.1175. The 0.5σ annulus has the weight of 0.2760, 1σ
has the weight of 0.4712, 2σ has the weight of 0.1242,
and 3σ (extending to infinity) has the weight of 0.0111.
III. TEST SETUP FOR THE QKD SYSTEM
We use our turbulence emulator to study the effect of
turbulence on free-space detection efficiency mismatch.
Eve’s experimental setup consists of two parts: the tur-
bulence emulator (SLM) and the beam scanning unit, as
shown in fig. 3. Our source is a 532 nm continuous-wave
laser that is first sent through a polarization beam split-
ter PBSE (Thorlabs CCM1-PBS251) to transmit only
horizontally-polarized light to the SLM, which ensures
phase-only modulation. The beam’s wavefront after the
SLM represents propagation through atmospheric tur-
bulence of a particular strength. We use a quarter-wave
plate textQWP textE (Thorlabs AQWP10M-600) to ro-
tate horizontal light to circularly polarized light to equal-
ize the QKD receiver detector signals on the four po-
larization channels. Eve’s scanning lens LE is mounted
on a two-axis motorized translation stage (Thorlabs
MAX343/M), which scans the attack beam’s angle. A
half-wave plate HWPE (Thorlabs AHWP10M-600) and
neutral density filter NDE (Thorlabs ND30A) are used
to control Eve’s intensity. Finally, the receiver is placed
13 m away from LE.
The QKD receiver under test is a prototype for a quan-
tum communication satellite [26], which uses a passive
basis choice to detect polarization-encoded light. Its tele-
scope consists of a focusing lens L1 (diameter of 50 mm
with a focal length f = 250 mm; Thorlabs AC508-
250-A), and a collimating lens L2 (diameter of 5 mm
with f = 11 mm; Thorlabs A397TM-A). The collimated
beam of . 2 mm diameter then passes through a 50:50
beam splitter BS (custom pentaprism [26]), and a pair
of polarization beam splitters PBS1 and PBS2 (Thor-
labs PBS121). The purpose of PBS2 is to increase the
polarization extinction ratio in the reflected path from
PBS1. The four lenses L3 (Thorlabs PAF-X-18-PC-A)
focus the beams into four multi-mode fibers, each with a
core diameter of 105 µm (Thorlabs M43L01), which are
connected to single-photon detectors (Excelitas SPCM-
AQRH-12-FC). We use one set of polarization optics and
detectors to measure diagonal D and anti-diagonal A
polarizations by rotating them 45◦ relative to the hori-
zontal H and vertical V polarization detectors. We note
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FIG. 3. Scanning setup. (a) Experimental setup of our spatial mode attack in a turbulent channel, top view (drawing not to
scale). The green central ray that is parallel to the optical axis denotes normal alignment of Alice’s beam into Bob’s receiver.
The red rays show the optical path of Eve’s scanning beam when tilted at an angle (θ, φ) via lens LE . CW: continuous-wave;
HWP: half-wave plate; QWP: quarter-wave plate; BS: beam splitter; PBS: polarization beam splitter; ND: neutral density filter;
SLM: spatial light modulator; L: lens. (b) Photograph of the actual free-space QKD receiver for detecting polarization-encoded
light.
that this receiver under test does not contain any active
pointing system or adaptive optics.
IV. ATTACK USING SPATIAL MODE
DETECTION EFFICIENCY MISMATCH
This paper assumes that Alice and Bob generate a se-
cret key using a non-decoy state BB84 protocol [1]. We
also make the weaker assumption presented in Ref. 13
that they only monitor the total detection rate for evi-
dence of Eve’s attack rather than the counts of each chan-
nel. Additionally, we assume Alice and Bob also monitor
only the average error rate over the four channels, and
terminate the protocol if the average quantum bit error
rate (QBER) over the four channels is higher than a 8%
threshold [12].
The attack model we consider is an intercept-resend
attack called the faked-state attack [4, 40]. In this at-
tack, Eve attempts to deterministically control Bob’s ba-
sis choice and detection outcomes without terminating
the protocol. To achieve this, Eve needs to maintain
the expected detection rate between Alice and Bob, and
keep the QBER below the termination threshold during
her attack. In our practical attack model, we assume
that Eve knows the attack angles for each polarization
state, as well as the detection efficiency ratios between
the detectors. Eve intercepts signals sent by Alice us-
ing an active basis choice receiver and superconducting
nanowire detectors with an overall detection efficiency of
85%. This interception could be done right in front of
Alice’s setup, to negate the turbulence effect on Eve’s
measurement. She then generates a signal with the same
polarization state as her measurement result, and sends
it to Bob at the ideal attack angle. These fake signals
may suffer from atmospheric turbulence in transmission
to Bob.
We assume that Eve is restricted to today’s technol-
ogy, and uses a weak coherent state for her resend signal.
Thus, Eve can control the mean photon number µ of her
pulses, as well as mimic scintillation caused by turbu-
lence in the free-space channel to avoid arousing suspi-
cion. Several free-space QKD systems employ pointing
and tracking systems that use a bright beacon source and
wave front sensor [23, 24, 41] which could be adapted by
Bob to monitor and correct beam wander. However, this
pointing system uses a separate beacon laser at a differ-
ent wavelength. This beacon laser does not need to be
tampered with by Eve, and the pointing is unaffected
by her attack. In the worst case, Eve could perform
an intercept-and-resend attack on the beacon beam such
that Bob’s receiver is pointed according to her designated
direction. Thus, this pointing and correction system can-
not prevent the attack in our model.
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FIG. 4. Normalized count rates τk for each detector k = H,V,D, or A at different incoming beam angles (θ, φ), and the
corresponding attack angles for different turbulence strengths r0. The attack angles for the four polarization detectors are
shown left to right as horizontal H (yellow), vertical V (red), diagonal D (green), and anti-diagonal A (light blue). The
emulated turbulence corresponds to different r0 values for an initial beam diameter D = 20 cm and λ = 532 nm. A smaller r0
value corresponds to stronger atmospheric turbulence.
To verify the possibility of a successful attack, we use
an optimization program to find the mean photon num-
ber that Eve should use for each attack angle to match
Bob’s expected total detection probability while mini-
mizing the QBER. Our detailed attack model and the
optimization process are explained in Ref. 13.
We first characterize a spatial mode attack for a chan-
nel without turbulence (r0 = ∞) before considering a
turbulent channel. The optical alignment between the
sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) is optimized by
equalizing the detection count rates of the four polariza-
tion channels for a beam propagating through the center
of the scanning lens LE [i.e., along the green center ray
shown in fig. 3(a)]. This initial alignment represents nor-
mal operation which has a scanning angle φ = θ = 0. We
then move the two-axis translation stage to adjust the po-
sition of lens LE, and record the four detection efficiencies
(H, V, D, and A) for different angles (θ, φ). In principle,
the tip-tilt angles induced on the beam by the scanning
lens are equivalent to including additional Zernike poly-
nomial terms in the SLM hologram. Furthermore, the
order in which the different Zernike polynomials are ap-
plied to the beam is interchangeable. As a result, our
configuration of having the scanning lens follow the SLM
is equivalent to Eve first steering the beam before it prop-
agates through atmospheric turbulence. The scan is per-
7formed in 135µrad steps, covering a range of ±2.7 mrad,
which corresponds to a lateral displacement of ±35 mm
along the front lens L1 of the QKD receiver.
In order for an angle to be a valid attack angle for
channel k (k = H,V,D, orA), it must satisfy the con-
dition that the probability of detection in channel k is
δk times greater than the detection probabilities of the
two channels in the other basis. For example, if k = H,
then min{τH/τD, τH/τA} > δH , where τk is the normal-
ized detection probability defined as the ratio between
the detection rate at the attack angle over the expected
detection probability of Bob. We continuously increase
the threshold δk until only a few attack angles satisfy
these conditions. From the attacker’s point of view, it
is desirable to have δk as large as possible because a
large value means an increased chance that detector k
will click while minimizing the detection probabilities of
the two other channels, which improves Eve’s knowledge
of Alice’s state.
The scan results without turbulence (r0 = ∞) for the
four polarization channels are shown in fig. 4(a), and the
corresponding detection efficiency mismatch parameters
are listed in table I. There are noticeable features that
cause efficiency mismatch, such as the side peak visible
below the center peak in the H detector’s map, and the
outer ring in all four detector maps. The valid attack
angles for the H detector correspond to when the click
probability is 22 times higher than D and A detectors
(i.e., δH = 22), and the normalized detection probability
τH = 0.1. Although the mismatch ratios on D (δD = 5)
and A (δA = 1.2) channels are small, the mismatch in H
and V (δV = 30) channels are sufficient for a successful
attack under our assumption that Alice and Bob only
monitor the total count rate (not individual channels).
The optimized QBER as a function of transmission loss
between Alice and Bob for a channel without turbulence
is shown in fig. 5. In a practical scenario, Alice and Bob
might experience transmission efficiency fluctuations in
their quantum channel. As a result, they need to tolerate
some deviation in their key rate from their estimated
value. Shown in fig. 5 is the QBER during Eve’s attack
as a function of the lowest transmission loss acceptable
to Alice and Bob. In the next section, we examine the
success of Eve’s attack in the presence of turbulence.
V. PRACTICAL ATTACK UNDER
TURBULENCE
To simulate our attack in the presence of atmospheric
turbulence, we use a set of 29 holograms per turbulence
strength, as described in Sec. II. We have performed
scans of our QKD receiver for five different turbulence
strengths: r0 = 7.00, 3.50, 2.21, 1.53, and 1.00 cm. Our
preliminary experiments that included tip-tilt wander
caused by turbulence (i.e., the second and third terms of
Zernike polynomials) showed that if Eve does not correct
for beam wander caused by turbulence, her attack is not
TABLE I. Detection efficiency mismatch parameters for at-
tack data shown in figs. 4 and 5. τk is the relative detection
efficiency at an attack angle compared to the normal inci-
dence case, and varies for different turbulence strengths due
to changes in the scanning features that lead to valid attack
angles. The value of the threshold of detection efficiency ra-
tio δk decreases under stronger turbulence. If the δk are too
low, it is impossible for Eve to find an optimal mean photon
number for her resend signal that matches Bob’s expected
detection rate and does not induce error above the termina-
tion threshold. * denotes the turbulence strengths where an
attack is not feasible.
r0 (cm)
δk τk
H V D A H V D A
∞ 22 30 5.0 1.2 0.1 0.03 0.3 0.001
7.00 20 5.0 1.03 3.5 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7
3.50 8.0 2.5 1.08 2.3 0.5 0.15 0.85 0.5
2.21 4.5 1.8 1.15 2.21 0.4 0.2 0.85 0.2
1.53 3.0 2.0 1.7 1.25 0.45 0.3 0.85 0.02
1.00* 1.2 1.7 1.02 1.01 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.15
feasible even under very weak turbulence (r0 = 7.00 cm)
corresponding to typical high-altitude atmospheric con-
ditions. The beam wander from tip-tilt alone was a
strong enough disturbance to significantly hinder her at-
tack. We then repeated the attack under the assumption
that Eve can correct for tip-tilt beam wander using adap-
tive optics, such as with a deformable mirror or SLM.
These corrections are implemented in our scans by set-
ting the weight of the second and third terms of Zernike
polynomials to zero.
In order to maintain accuracy and stability in our
scans, we have chosen to cycle through all 29 holograms
at one lens position before moving the translation stage
to the next position. This method ensures each hologram
is applied to the same scanning angle. We then repeat
this scanning process for a total of 1681 angle positions,
and record 29 separate detection rates per attack angle
for each of the four polarization channels. To represent
the Gaussian distribution of centroid displacements dis-
cussed in Sec. II, the final normalized detection efficiency
of each detector τk is given by a weighted average of the
detection rates from each hologram per scanning angle
(θ, φ),
τk(θ, φ) =
N∑
i=1
Φiτk,i(θ, φ), (3)
where τk,i is the average detection efficiency of the k de-
tector under the holograms selected from the ith radius.
Φi is the probability of occurrence of the ith partition
discussed in Sec. II. N = 5 is the number of partitions.
We select one sample hologram for no turbulence, eight
samples each for 0.5σ, 1σ, 2σ partition, and four samples
from the 3σ partition. The samples are given the weight
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FIG. 5. Modeled attack performance. Quantum bit error
rate (QBER) as a function of transmission loss for no turbu-
lence (blue solid line) and different turbulence strengths corre-
sponding to r0 = 7.00 cm (pink dashed line), 3.50 cm (green
dotted line), 2.21 cm (red dot-dashed line), 1.53 cm (black
dashed line), and 1.00 cm (cyan dashed line). The horizontal
gray dashed line denotes the 8% threshold where Eve’s attack
is successful when QBER is below this value in our attack
model. The maximum transmission loss where Eve’s attack
is successful decreases as turbulence strength increases. The
mismatch ratios are too small in the case of 1.00 cm (δk ≤ 2
for all channels), and the optimization program could not find
a solution with a QBER below 8% threshold given any trans-
mission loss. The higher QBER at low loss (i.e., 3.5–7 dB) is
because Eve has to send higher mean photon number states
for channels with lower δk in order to match the expected
detection rate of Bob.
factor corresponding to the radius from the sample used
to the next larger sample, thus representing the best case
hologram from this range. This weight factor ensures
that the samples form an optimistic (easier to hack) rep-
resentation of the turbulence effect, and therefore ensure
that any turbulence found to not be vulnerable to attacks
is indeed safe under the parameter monitoring assump-
tions. The total detection rate τk is used to find valid
attack angles under turbulent conditions using the same
method as without turbulence. We then repeat this pro-
cess for different turbulence strengths from very weak
(r0 = 7.00 cm) to stronger turbulence emulating low-
altitude sea level conditions (r0 = 1.00 cm). A map of
successful attack angles and the corresponding detection
efficiency mismatch parameters are shown in fig. 4(b)–(f)
and table I.
Our scanning results in table I show that as the tur-
bulence strength increases, the mismatch ratios δk are
significantly reduced. We can see in fig. 4 that the fea-
tures that are responsible for efficiency mismatch become
blurry and eventually disappear as turbulence increases
in strength, and it becomes harder for Eve to maintain
a precise attack angle when r0 ≤ 1.53 cm. For stronger
turbulence (r0 = 1.00 cm), the only remaining hackable
feature is the displacement of the center peaks due to
a slight misalignment between the fiber couplers in each
arm of the receiver. As a result, most of the attack an-
gles at stronger turbulence are found closer to the center
peak. However, they do not result in a successful attack
for r0 < 1.53 cm because the induced QBER is above the
8% termination threshold.
In order to perform a quantitative verification of an
attack, we use an optimization program to find the mini-
mal QBER as a function of transmission loss. The results
in fig. 5 show that the optimized QBER for an attack in
stronger turbulence (r0 = 2.21 cm) is higher than that
of weaker turbulence (r0 = 7.00 cm). If we assume that
the QBER threshold for Alice and Bob to terminate the
protocol is 8 %, then the attack without turbulence is
successful as long as the transmission loss between Al-
ice and Bob is less than 21 dB, whereas in the presence
of turbulence, Eve can successfully attack this receiver
for r0 ≥ 2.21 cm when the transmission loss is less than
10 dB but higher than 7 dB. Using eq. (1), r0 = 2.21 cm
is equivalent to Eve having her resend setup approxi-
mately 0.5 km away from Bob’s receiver in typical sea
level turbulence conditions (C2n = 1.8 × 10−14 m−2/3).
Eve is unable to match Bob’s count rate for transmission
loss below 3.5 dB even if she uses all four channels due
to Eve’s non-perfect detection efficiency. Therefore, the
optimization program could not find a solution matching
Bob’s total detection rates for transmission losses below
3.5 dB.
The result for r0 = 1.53 cm shows that there is only
a small loss window (around 8.5 dB) where Eve can at-
tack without inducing a QBER higher than the threshold.
Using eq. (1) and the value of C2n given above, this r0 cor-
responds to a distance of 1 km. At lower transmission
loss (i.e., 3.5–7 dB), the expected detection rate at Bob
is too high for Eve to match using a single channel, and
therefore she must also use the other channels that have a
lower δk. This causes the QBER to increase and results
in the irregularities seen for loss below 7 dB when the
number of channels being used is changed. The QBER
curves become smoother at higher loss once Eve can fully
replicate Bob’s detection rates while only sending signals
to a single polarization channel, which takes advantage of
the greatest efficiency mismatch for an optimized attack.
The mismatch ratios in the case of 1.00 cm (δk ≤ 2 for
all channels) are too small for the optimization program
to find a solution for a QBER below the threshold given
any transmission loss.
Implementations of QKD can and should monitor
counts at each detector to ensure they remain relatively
balanced. The higher QBER obtained when Eve is forced
to send states to channels with lower mismatch ratios il-
lustrates how monitoring each channel would increase the
difficulty of a successful attack. However, it is uncom-
mon in practice to monitor individual count rates, and
there are no current standards or established guidelines
for allowable variation in detection rates. The added con-
straint to maintain precise detection rates would make
hacking more difficult for an eavesdropper, but does not
in itself prevent an attack. It also does not invalidate
the current work of determining if bounds exist on the
turbulence strength where QKD systems can be hacked.
9VI. THEORETICAL LIMIT OF ATTACK
UNDER TURBULENCE
The attack described in Sec. V is only one particular
example of an intercept-resend attack. Other attacks in
this class may exist which shows that a QKD system
with detection efficiency mismatch could be insecure if
the security analysis does not take the mismatch into
account. Whenever the observed and monitored data
are compatible with an IR attack, no secret key can be
obtained [42, 43].
For this reason, it is useful to ask the question whether
the data we observe are consistent with an IR attack or
not. Along the way we can also answer the question
whether a fine-grained analysis of the observations could
exclude IR attacks, and thus potentially give a secure
key where the coarse-grained analysis (which uses only
average error rate and average detection rate) fails.
The handle to determine whether given data are com-
patible with an IR attack or not is the fact that IR attacks
make the channel between Alice and Bob entanglement
breaking. That is, this channel acting as one system of a
bipartite entangled state will transform it into a separa-
ble bipartite state. So by verifying that the channel is not
entanglement breaking, we can exclude the IR attacks.
To do so, we do not require actual entanglement: we
can probe the channel with non-orthogonal signal states,
just as in any prepare-and-measure QKD set-up, and use
the formalism of the source-replacement scheme (see for
example Ref. [44]) to formulate an equivalent thought
set-up that virtually uses an entangled state. The proba-
bilities p(ab|xy) between Alice’s signal choice a and Bob’s
measurement result b for respective basis choices x and
y can then be thought of as coming from measurements
on this entangled state with both Alice and Bob per-
forming measurements with POVM elements Mx,aA and
My,bB , respectively. If these observations serve as an en-
tanglement witness, we have shown that the channel is
not entanglement breaking.
We can formulate the entanglement verification prob-
lem as the optimization problem
find ρAB
subject to ρAB ≥ 0 and ρΓAAB ≥ 0
Tr(ρABM
x,a
A ⊗My,bB ) = p(ab|xy),∀a, b, xy.
(4)
Here ΓA is the partial transpose operation on Alice’s sys-
tem. If the above optimization problem is not feasible,
then the state ρAB is entangled [45]. In our previous work
[34], we developed a method to solve the above optimiza-
tion problem when detectors’ efficiencies are mismatched
and the dimension of the optical signal is unbounded.
In this paper, we did not measure the joint distribu-
tion p(ab|xy) of Alice and Bob directly in the experi-
ment. However, given the characterization of detection
efficiency mismatch from our experiment, we can deduce
the joint distribution of Alice and Bob from the case
without efficiency mismatch according to our simulation
model. Using the method developed in Ref. 34, we found
that when there is no turbulence or very weak turbulence
r0 = 7.00 cm, we cannot verify entanglement. Thus, the
channel is vulnerable. This result is in agreement with
the results in Ref. 34.
However, when turbulence is stronger (r0 ≤ 3.50 cm),
our calculation shows that entanglement can be verified.
This means that there is no intercept-resend strategy for
Eve that can match all of Alice and Bob’s expected ob-
servations. This result is based on a strong condition
where Eve needs to match all expected measurable pa-
rameters of Alice and Bob. Whereas, the results pre-
sented in Sec. V were under the practical assumptions
that Alice and Bob monitor only coarse-grained informa-
tion, namely the total detection rate and error rate.
VII. CONCLUSION
We experimentally study how atmospheric turbulence
in a free-space channel can affect an eavesdropper’s abil-
ity to perform a spatial mode attack on a QKD receiver.
We use a phase-only spatial light modulator to emulate
atmospheric turbulence in the laboratory, the accuracy
of which is verified by comparing measured far-field in-
tensity distributions and centroid displacements to the-
oretical predictions. We then study a spatial mode de-
tection efficiency mismatch attack under a range of at-
mospheric turbulence strengths to determine the maxi-
mum unsafe radius around the free-space QKD receiver.
Our attack model is based on an intercept-resend attack
under the practical assumptions that only the total de-
tection rate and QBER are monitored by Alice and Bob.
We find that for this particular receiver, an eavesdropper
could attack a non-decoy state BB84 system from up to
about 1 km away in typical sea level turbulence condi-
tions (r0 = 1.53 cm for a 20 cm beam at 532 nm). This
result is assuming Eve can correct for basic tip-tilt beam
wander using conventional adaptive optics. Eve’s chances
of success will be further reduced if Alice and Bob choose
to monitor individual detection channel statistics. In this
case, we theoretically find that an IR attack is still possi-
ble for weaker turbulence (r0 ≥ 7.0 cm). The assumption
that an eavesdropper has physical limitations is not usu-
ally included in the security analysis of a QKD system.
If there is a chance that Eve is inside this secure zone
around Bob’s receiver, or has advanced adaptive optics
capacities to correct for beam aberrations, then extra
care regarding these types of attacks may be required.
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